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 AFTERLIFE OF THE DEATH TAX 
SAMUEL D. BRUNSON* 
More than a century ago, Congress enacted the modern estate tax to help pay for 
World War I. Unlike previous iterations of the estate tax, though, this one outlived 
the war and accumulated additional goals beyond merely raising revenue. The estate 
tax helped ensure the progressivity of the tax system as a whole, and it limited the 
hereditary ability to accumulate wealth. 
This modern estate tax almost instantly met with opposition, though. The 
opposition has never been sufficient to entirely eliminate the estate tax, but it has 
severely weakened its ability to raise revenue and to prevent the accumulation of 
wealth. As a result, today’s estate tax is functionally a zombie: it accounts for less 
than one percent of federal revenues and does little to prevent the accumulation of 
wealth among a small group of citizens. The estate tax largely serves to evoke fear 
and costly tax planning, but it only manages to bite the largest and slowest estates. 
Although the estate tax has proven hard to kill, it is time for Congress to end it 
definitively and transfer its functions as revenue raiser and impediment to wealth 
accumulation to the income tax. To effect that transfer, Congress needs to do three 
things: First, it should treat death as a realization event and tax estates on their 
assets’ unrealized appreciation. Second, it should treat the receipt of an inheritance 
as gross income in the hands of heirs, thereby requiring heirs to pay income tax on 
their inheritance. Third, Congress should eliminate the step-up in basis and, instead, 
assign basis to inherited property under ordinary basis rules. By making these three 
changes, Congress can put to rest the zombie estate tax, while, at the same time, 
revivifying taxation at death. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, the current estate tax is a zombie, neither fully alive nor fully dead. 
Certainly it raises revenue. It raises far less than it did in its prime, though, the result 
of serious limitations and gross unpopularity that leave it hobbled.1 Although it has 
been seriously wounded, it lumbers on, not yet dead, and virtually impossible to kill. 
Not that politicians have not tried to kill it. In fact, on September 27, 2017, the 
Trump administration presaged the estate tax’s death in its framework for a promised 
fundamental tax reform.2 The nine-page framework, while light on details, laid out 
the administration’s priorities. One of those priorities was the repeal of the estate 
tax.3 
The estate tax has been the bête noire of at least some legislators even before the 
modern estate tax was conceived. As early as 1898, Populist Senator William V. 
Allen decried the estate tax, arguing that the country should tax estates while the 
“husband is alive, when he is competent to earn a living for his family and to 
accumulate[.] Why wait until his widow is in weeds and his children in tears before 
you undertake to collect anything from his estate?”4 
At least some corners of the Republican Party have shared Senator Allen’s distaste 
for the estate tax from the early decades of the twentieth century. Congress enacted 
the modern estate tax in 1916.5 By the 1920s—the new estate tax’s infancy 
—Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon argued for its repeal or, at least, its 
reduction.6 Democrats, and some Republicans, opposed him, and for the first half of 
the decade, decedents faced significant estate tax volatility, with Congress raising 
the tax rate dramatically, then slashing it a couple years later.7 It survived, though, 
and, over its first half-century, Congress experimented with it until, in 1976, 
Congress enacted the current version of the estate tax, integrating it with the gift tax.8 
While the estate tax has always had enemies, by the end of the twentieth century, 
those enemies grew more organized and vocal. The late 1980s saw the births of 
several groups bent on eliminating the estate tax.9 By the beginning of the twenty-
first century, eliminating the tax had transformed into an integral part of the 
Republican legislative agenda.10 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See infra notes 29–32. 
 2. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Alan Rappeport, Sweeping Trump Tax Plan Vague on 
Details and Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2017, at A1. 
 3. UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR FIXING OUR BROKEN TAX CODE 6 (2017), https://www 
.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Tax-Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/DL7U-THT2] (“The framework repeals the death tax and the generation-skipping transfer 
tax.”). 
 4. 31 CONG. REC. 5081 (1898). 
 5. David J. Herzig, The Income Equality Case for Eliminating the Estate Tax, 90 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1143, 1149 (2017). 
 6. JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR 21 
(2013). 
 7. Id. at 21–22. 
 8. Herzig, supra note 5, at 1157. 
 9. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER 
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 12–13 (2005). 
 10. Id. at 268. 
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If it has always had its opponents, why did the United States enact an estate tax 
in the first place? Today, proponents of the estate tax point to three functions it 
serves: it raises revenue, it increases the progressivity of the federal tax system, and 
it reduces hereditary concentrations of wealth.11 It is important to note two things 
about these functions. First, when Congress originally enacted the estate tax, its 
members appear to have been principally, and perhaps solely, motivated by the 
revenue the estate tax would produce. Second, the modern estate tax performs rela-
tively poorly at each of these three goals. 
While some early proponents of the estate tax appear to have supported it as a 
way to limit the hereditary transfer of wealth,12 the actual enactment of the modern 
estate tax did not occur as a result of these arguments. Rather, the principal purpose 
motivating Congress to enact the estate tax was a need for revenue, not 
considerations of progressivity or breaking up the transmission of wealth.13 
Congress’s original enactment of the estate tax was driven by the exigencies of 
entering World War I, which demanded additional revenue.14 The modern federal 
estate tax was not the federal government’s first foray into estate taxation, however. 
Three times prior, in 1797, 1862, and 1898, Congress had imposed a tax triggered by 
decedents’ deaths.15 Like the modern estate tax, each of those taxes corresponded to 
increased revenue needs precipitated by wars (an impending war with France, the 
Civil War, and the Spanish-American War, respectively).16 
Unlike the modern estate tax, though, these precursor taxes each went away after 
the war (or, in the case of France, the threat of war) ended.17 Their disappearance 
when the revenue was no longer needed bolsters the case that, in Congress’s mind, 
the primary purpose of estate taxation was to raise the revenue necessary to fight in 
a war. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 270 
(1983); M.C. Mirow & Bruce A. McGovern, An Obituary of the Federal Estate Tax, 43 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 625, 627 (2001). 
 12. For example, at the turn of the century, Andrew Carnegie “proposed drastic 
limitations on the passage of wealth at one’s death.” Mirow & McGovern, supra note 11, at 
627. And in 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that there was no social value to 
allowing wealthy individuals to transmit their “enormous fortunes” to their heirs. Louis 
Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 229 (1956). 
 13. Joseph J. Thorndike, The Century of the Estate Tax: Made for Revenue, Not 
Redistribution, 152 TAX NOTES 1330, 1332–33 (2016). In fact, in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt made it clear that he believed the 
concentration of wealth to be inevitable, and that government should only break up such 
concentrated wealth if the money were being used “to the detriment of the general public.” 
Camden Hutchison, Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation and the Failure of the 
Federal Chartering Movement, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1017, 1062 (2017). 
 14. Paul L. Caron, The One-Hundredth Anniversary of the Federal Estate Tax: It’s Time 
to Renew Our Vows, 57 B.C. L. REV. 823, 825 (2016). 
 15. Eisenstein, supra note 12, at 225, 227. In fact, Congress also imposed a type of 
inheritance tax in its abortive 1894 income tax. In that case, though, the tax treated inheritance 
as income and was struck down by the Supreme Court as part of its general holding that the 
1894 income tax was unconstitutional. Id. at 227 & n.22. 
 16. Caron, supra note 14, at 824–25. 
 17. Id. 
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The modern estate tax, on the other hand, is over a century old.18 Although 
Congress significantly lowered the income tax’s top marginal rates after World War 
I ended, it retained the estate tax to continue as “a significant feature of the revenue 
system.”19 In fact, with the exception of a one-year disappearance in 2010,20 the 
modern federal estate tax has survived through times of war and times of peace, 
through periods of high revenue needs and lower revenue needs. 
The estate tax has become largely ineffective at accomplishing either of its 
primary goals. It raises a vanishingly small percentage of federal revenue and has 
done little to prevent dynastic wealth.21 At the same time, though, it exists as a 
shadow taxpayers need to be aware of and as an obstacle that they plan around.22 As 
a zombie tax regime, the estate tax will only achieve its goals to the extent that 
taxpayers fall within its reach. Not all taxpayers can easily avoid the estate tax, of 
course: for a billionaire to avoid it, she would have to make significant charitable 
bequests and otherwise reduce her estate by an enormous percentage. But by and 
large, the estate tax captures decedents who failed to take proper measures to avoid 
it. 
In spite of the short reach of the estate tax, decedents’ relative ease in avoiding it, 
and Republicans’ anti-estate tax rhetoric, Congress has thus far been unsuccessful in 
killing the estate tax. The moment has arrived, though. Congress should finish the 
job it began, eliminating the estate tax and replacing it with a post-estate tax. This 
post-estate tax would comprise three changes to current income taxation: (a) treating 
death as a realization event and taxing decedents’ estates on their unrecognized gains; 
(b) replacing the current federal estate tax with a federal inheritance tax instead;23 
and (c) eliminating the special step-up in basis on inherited assets and replacing it 
with ordinary cost basis. 
This Article will proceed to discuss the replacement of today’s zombie estate tax 
with a post-estate tax regime as follows: Part I will describe why I characterize the 
estate tax as a zombie. It will lay out the estate tax’s failings both in raising revenue 
and in curtailing income inequality. Part II will then explain in greater detail what 
the post-estate tax would look like. It will discuss each of the three parts of the post-
estate tax and how they will function. 
The post-estate tax poses certain technical questions that would have to be 
addressed, including both how estates will pay and how it will deal with the antiabuse 
regimes that will die with the estate tax. Part III will explain how many of the details 
should be structured. Finally, Part IV will look at questions of tax fairness. It will 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. Id. at 823. 
 19. STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 81 (2008). 
 20. Matthew B. Gaudin, Note, The Federal Estate Tax and the National Debt: Why the 
Debt Forces a Defense of the Tax, 45 IND. L. REV. 159, 160 (2011) (“In 2010, [the Economic 
Growth and Tax Reconciliation Relief Act] entirely eliminated the estate tax.”). I will discuss 
the one-year disappearance of the estate tax infra. 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. The costs imposed by planning around the estate tax are deadweight losses, costs that 
provide no benefit for society at large. See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 23. For an explanation of the differences between inheritance and estate taxes, see infra 
notes 104–106 and accompanying text. 
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explain how to ensure that the post-estate tax can be implemented fairly, especially 
with respect to vertical equity concerns. 
I. A ZOMBIE ESTATE TAX 
It is likely that, in spite of the sustained attack on the estate tax, its opponents will 
find it difficult to fully revoke. President Bush, after all, could only eliminate it for a 
single year.24 And in spite of the 2017 tax reform framework’s prioritizing the 
elimination of the estate tax,25 Congress almost immediately faced dissent from 
within the Republican party.26 Ultimately, in spite of controlling the presidency and 
both houses of Congress,27 the estate tax survived. Congress did manage to weaken 
the estate tax by doubling the exemption amount, but the estate tax lives on.28 
Even though estate tax repeal is not as inevitable as political rhetoric makes it 
appear, perhaps it is time for its proponents to rethink the benefits of the estate tax. 
Even though the estate tax survived the latest—and perhaps the most likely—attempt 
at revocation, Congress has significantly neutered its ability to raise revenue or to 
limit inequality. There is no inherent reason why the estate tax could not effectively 
raise federal revenue. In the first quarter-century of the modern estate tax’s existence, 
it raised between one and ten percent of federal revenue.29 In fact, the height of its 
revenue-raising prowess came in 1936, when the estate tax was responsible for 
raising eleven percent of federal revenues.30 Since the end of World War II, the estate 
tax has never raised more than 2.5% of federal revenues,31 and in recent years, it has 
come nowhere near that 2.5% mark. In 2015, the estate tax raised a historically low 
0.6% of federal revenues, the result of a high exemption amount and a low tax rate.32 
In 2017, even with no estate planning, a decedent only owed estate tax to the 
extent the value of her estate exceeds $5.49 million.33 And as of 2018, she will only 
pay taxes to the extent the value of her estate exceeds $10 million, adjusted for 
inflation.34 Moreover, she only owed taxes at a 40% rate,35 a rate that is virtually 
identical to the 39.6% top marginal rate applicable at the time to such a taxpayer on 
her income.36 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See Michael M. Gleeson, Frustrated Estate Planners Look in Vain for Help from 
Congress, 133 TAX NOTES 666, 666 (2011). 
 25. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 26. Richard Rubin, GOP Support Ebbs for Estate-Tax Repeal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2017, 
at A2. 
 27. Marie Sapirie, The Rise and Fall of the Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax, 157 TAX 
NOTES 1670, 1670 (2017). 
 28. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 11061(a) (2017). 
 29. Caron, supra note 14, at 825. 
 30. Graetz, supra note 11, at 269. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Caron, supra note 14, at 826–27. 
 33. Rev. Proc. 2016-55 § 3.35, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. 
 34. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(C) (Supp. V 2018). 
 35. Id. § 2001(c) (2012). 
 36. See id. § 1(i)(3)(A)(ii). In 2018, the inflation-adjusted unified credit is $11.18 million. 
Rev. Proc. 2018-18 § 3.35, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392. 
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If the sole purpose behind having an estate tax were to raise revenue, these figures 
would be damning. A tax intended solely to raise revenue must raise revenue. 
Otherwise, the complexity and distortions it creates in taxpayer behavior are not 
offset by the benefits it provides to society. 
But, while revenue concerns motivated Congress to enact the estate tax, revenue 
is not the only benefit the tax provides. As mentioned above, proponents also point 
out that, in theory, the estate tax can increase the tax system’s overall progressivity 
and can break up the dynastic transmission of wealth.37 In fact, as Congress made 
adjustments to the estate tax as part of the Revenue Act of 1932, it justified the estate 
tax not solely as a way to raise revenue, but also as a tool to break up and redistribute 
private fortunes.38 
In a progressive tax system, tax rates increase as taxpayers move up some scale.39 
That scale is often income, but can also be wealth, consumption, or other financial 
measures.40 The federal estate tax clearly qualifies as progressive; in 2017, decedents 
could exempt from estate taxation the first $5.49 million that they left to their heirs.41 
Because each decedent can take advantage of this exemption, a married couple could 
effectively leave almost $11 million to their heirs in 2017 without paying the estate 
tax.42 Estates in excess of the exemption amount pay taxes on that excess at a forty-
percent tax rate.43 Moreover, between 2018 and 2025, the exclusion amount for 
individuals (and thus for married couples) has doubled.44 In other words, only 
married couples who have enough wealth to leave more than $22 million to their 
heirs in 2018 even face the estate tax.45 In 2015 (when the exemption amount was $5 
million), only 0.2% of decedents paid the estate tax.46 With the higher exemption 
amount, that percentage will likely be significantly lower. 
While that clearly puts the estate tax in the progressive category, though, it is not 
entirely clear how much progressivity it adds to the tax system. On the one hand, 
economist David Joulfaian has calculated that, in 2008, decedents who filed estate 
tax returns paid significantly more in estate taxes than they had paid in income taxes 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 38. Herzig, supra note 5, at 1152. 
 39. Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 742 (1995). 
 40. Id. 
 41. I.R.C. § 2010(a); Rev. Proc. 2016-55 § 3.35, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. 
The exclusion amount is adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(B). 
 42. See Robert B. Smith, Should We Give Away the Annual Exclusion?, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 
361, 372 n.31 (1993). 
 43. I.R.C. § 2001(c). Technically, estates face twelve marginal tax rates, but the highest 
rate applies to estates in excess of $1 million. Id. Because the unified credit exceeds $1 million, 
however, no estate will cycle through the lower rates. 
 44. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(C) (Supp. V 2018). 
 45. Note, too, that even where a decedent’s estate exceeds the exemption amount, it is 
possible that she will owe no estate tax. She can, for example, donate the excess to charity. 
Charitable contributions reduce the size of the taxable estate. Id. § 2055(a) (2012). But she can 
also reduce the size of her taxable estate while not divesting any of her assets. For instance, if 
the decedent owns a partnership interest in a family limited partnership, rather than owning 
assets directly, the decedent can reduce the value of her distributive share of partnership assets. 
See, e.g., Estate of Giustina v. Comm’r, 111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1551 (T.C. 2016). 
 46. Caron, supra note 14, at 826–27. 
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the prior year and that the ratio of estate taxes to income taxes grew as estate size 
grew.47 The year before death may not be representative of an individual’s real tax 
burden, though, so to correct for that, Dr. Joulfaian looked at the ratio of estate tax 
to income taxes paid over the last ten years of a decedent’s life. Even there, the 
amount decedents paid in estate taxes on average doubled the amount of income taxes 
they had paid over the last decade of their lives.48 
Of course, in 2008, the exemption amount was $2 million (or about $9 million 
less than in 2018), while the estate tax rate, at forty-five percent, was five percentage 
points higher than 2018.49 With the increased exemption amount and the decreased 
tax rate, the amount by which a decedent’s estate tax exceeds her income tax is likely 
to be lower, and perhaps significantly lower. 
In fact, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that estates of 
individuals who died in 2017 would pay an average effective tax rate of seventeen 
percent on the value of the estate.50 And, while those averages increase with estate 
size, according to the Tax Policy Center’s model, taxable estates worth more than 
$20 million paid an average effective rate of nineteen percent.51 
While the estate tax likely continues to add to the progressivity of the overall U.S. 
federal tax system, then, it adds less progressivity today than it did in earlier 
decades.52 The goal of a tax system that is progressive overall continues to be an 
important one, but, for the estate tax to significantly aid that progressivity, Congress 
would need to fix it.53 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. David Joulfaian, What Do We Know About the Behavioral Effects of the Estate Tax?, 
57 B.C. L. REV. 843, 847 (2016). 
 48. Id. 
 49. David Austill & Mehmet C. Kocakülâh, Death of Death Taxes: Not Likely, 123 TAX 
NOTES 433, 435 (2009). 
 50. CHYE-CHING HUANG & CHLOE CHO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, TEN FACTS 
YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 2 (2017), https://www.cbpp.org 
/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-8-15tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/R79D-TRE3]. 
 51. T16-0277 - Current Law Distribution of Gross Estate and Net Estate Tax by Size of 
Gross Estate, 2017, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model 
-estimates/baseline-estate-tax-tables-nov-2016/t16-0277-current-law-distribution-gross-estate 
[https://perma.cc/SW65-33BG]. 
 52. According to IRS Statistics of Income data, in 2009, taxable estates worth between 
$3.5 million and $5 million paid an average effective estate tax rate of 6.5%. Estates worth 
between $5 million and $10 million paid 17.5%, between $10 million and $20 million paid 
24.5%, and estates worth more than $20 million paid estate taxes at a 20.7% rate. By 2013, 
estates worth less than $5 million paid no estate tax. Between $5 million and $10 million, the 
effective estate tax rate had fallen by more than four percentage points, to 13.1%. The effective 
tax on estates worth between $10 million and $20 million had fallen to 21.6%, a drop of three 
percentage points. Meanwhile, the tax on estates worth more than $20 million had risen by 0.1 
percentage points to 20.8%. See SOI Tax Stats - Estate Tax Data, by Year of Death, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-estate-tax-statistics-year-of-death-table-1 [https://perma 
.cc/E3MA-VZ6P] (last updated Oct. 12, 2018) (follow “2009” and “2013” hyperlinks). 
 53. Caron, supra note 14, at 836–37 (“With the nation mired in the slowest post-recession 
recovery since the 1930s, the estate tax should be enlisted to begin to put our fiscal house in 
order and stem the growth of income inequality in America.”).  
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Finally, proponents of the estate tax argue that it is an important tool in breaking 
up dynastic wealth. Academics have raised a number of reasons why the transmission 
of dynastic wealth should be limited. Some argue that wealth concentration—like 
what occurs in the intrafamilial transfer of wealth—harms economic growth.54 
Wealth allows its holders significant influence on politicians and on the media. When 
that wealth stays within a single family, that influence will not benefit from the new 
ideas and experiences the holders bring with them.55 
In the United States, approximately fifty percent of wealth is inherited wealth.56 
And the estate tax is doing little to break up that dynastic wealth. In recent years, 
only about 0.2% of decedents have even paid the estate tax,57 and effective rates are 
far from confiscatory.58 While the estate tax is meant in part as a tool in the fight 
against wealth inequality, the estate tax is losing. Between 1978 and 2012, the share 
of wealth held by the 0.1% richest families more than tripled, from seven percent to 
twenty-two percent.59 In the meantime, the share of wealth held by the bottom ninety 
percent has fallen from a high of thirty-five percent in the mid-1980s to about twenty-
three percent in 2012.60 
These numbers reflect both dynastic and self-made wealth, though the ratio of the 
two is unclear.61 No matter what percentage of that wealth is dynastic, though, the 
estate tax has been unable to prevent the growth of income inequality. 
Why is the estate tax, as progressive as it is on paper, so ineffective at breaking 
up dynastic wealth and otherwise preventing the consolidation of wealth into fewer 
and fewer hands? As a result of the high exemption amount and the relatively low 
tax rate, few Americans pay the estate tax, and those who do contribute a relatively 
miniscule amount of revenue to the federal government. In 2013, 2.6 million 
Americans died. Of those decedents, 11,300 filed estate tax returns, and only 4700 
owed any estate tax.62 In other words, about 0.4% of decedents’ estates filed an estate 
tax return and 0.2% paid the estate tax. The amount they paid in estate taxes 
constitutes significantly less than one percent of federal revenue.63 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 849 (2001). 
 55. Id. at 850. Those assertions are contestable, of course. To sidestep that debate, 
Professor Miranda Perry Fleischer has suggested focusing on an ill of dynastic wealth that is 
less controversial: that there is “something antithetical to this country’s democratic ideals 
about being able to transfer power and influence to one’s heirs.” Miranda Perry Fleischer, 
Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax to Combat Dynastic Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. 
L. REV. 913, 915 (2016). 
 56. Repetti, supra note 54, at 849. 
 57. Caron, supra note 14, at 824. 
 58. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 59. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20625, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20625 [https://perma.cc 
/83LX-YRD9]. 
 60. Id. at 3. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: How Many People Pay the Estate Tax?, TAX 
POL’Y CTR.: BRIEFING BOOK, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-many 
-people-pay-estate-tax [https://perma.cc/JM5G-HJAU]. 
 63. Andrew Lundeen, The Estate Tax Provides Less than One Percent of Federal 
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In contrast, although during the first year of the modern federal income tax, it only 
reached almost two percent of American households,64 today, more than fifty-five 
percent of American households pay the federal income tax.65 Where the income tax 
shifted from a class tax to a mass tax,66 the estate tax has gone the opposite direction. 
No longer just a class tax, the modern estate tax is a steroidal class tax. 
Even as a steroidal class tax, though, it does little to stem inequality. In 2016, 
decedents’ estates paid about $18 billion in estate taxes.67 That is less than ten percent 
of the $192 billion reported on the 12,411 estate tax returns filed that year.68 It is 
about twenty-six percent of the amount of wealth held by the six heirs to the Wal-
Mart fortune.69 And it is a miniscule fraction of the total wealth held by the top one 
percent wealthiest Americans.70 
By and large, then, the current incarnation of the estate tax fails at both its original 
purpose (raising revenue) and its subsequent adopted purposes (maintaining 
progressivity and reducing economic inequality). It perhaps serves a rhetorical 
purpose, proclaiming that society cares about economic inequality, but it is time to 
rethink whether merely asserting that message is sufficient reason to keep the estate 
tax. If we let go of the estate tax, we can replace it with an alternative that can 
successfully raise revenue, maintain progressivity, and combat the accumulation of 
wealth among a limited group of people. 
II. A POST-ESTATE TAX: WHAT COMES NEXT 
While I will recommend a replacement for the estate tax in the following pages, I 
must note that there is no pressing need to revoke and replace the estate tax. Its 
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current incarnation is that of a zombie “slowly stumbl[ing] along in search of brains 
upon which to feed, exhibiting little personality or ability to think.”71 It may threaten 
an estate if the estate comes within its grasp, but it is relatively easy to avoid the 
dangers it poses. 
Certainly, in its current incarnation, the estate tax does little to raise revenue or to 
combat inequality. But these faults of the estate tax do not arise because of anything 
inherent to the idea of taxing decedents’ estates. Rather, they come from deliberate 
choices Congress has made to neuter the estate tax.72 The estate tax could effectively 
raise revenue and reduce inequality if Congress decided to let it do so.73 
The problem is, there is no indication that Congress intends to do so. While 
Congress may lack the political will to actually do away with the estate tax, there is 
no reason to believe that it has the will to make the estate tax effective, either. It 
seems likely that the estate tax will persist, albeit in its current crippled form, in 
which it continues to reach few estates and raise little money. 
In spite of the estate tax’s limitations and unpopularity, it seems unlikely to go 
away of its own accord. In 2017, congressional Republicans may have had their best 
chance of eliminating the estate tax. They passed a tax reform bill without getting a 
single Democratic vote.74 The original version of the bill passed by the House of 
Representatives eliminated the estate tax for decedents who died after 2024.75 By the 
final enacted version, though, the estate tax had been weakened, but not killed. The 
enacted bill doubled the exemption amount but eliminated the eventual repeal of the 
estate tax.76 
Still, perhaps it is time for estate tax proponents to band together with its 
opponents to definitively kill the estate tax. There is little benefit in allowing it to 
continue limping along, adding complexity and inefficiency to the tax law without 
compensating for that complexity and inefficiency. Moreover, eliminating the estate 
tax will also eliminate a certain amount of deadweight loss.77 A tax produces 
deadweight loss when its cost to taxpayers exceeds the revenue it provides for the 
government.78 The existence of the estate tax “notoriously impel[s] many people to 
engage in other sorts of complicated estate tax avoidance activities.”79 If the 
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government can raise the same amount of revenue with less avoidance opportunity 
—and thus less deadweight loss—it makes sense to eliminate the estate tax and 
replace it with another, more efficient source of revenue. 
Therefore, unless Congress intends to fix the estate tax—an intent that it has 
signaled fairly clearly that it will not make—it makes little sense to allow the estate 
tax to continue limping on, at least if there is an alternative that will better meet the 
goals of the estate tax. 
And there are such alternatives. I propose three changes to the income tax that 
will help it replace the estate tax both with respect to the estate tax’s original purpose 
(that is, to raise revenue) and its current purported purposes (that is, to maintain 
progressivity and to limit the concentration of wealth). Those three changes would 
be to treat death as a realization event, treat the receipt of inheritances as gross 
income to the heir, and replace the step-up in basis with ordinary basis rules.80 These 
three changes, in tandem, will provide a more effective and more efficient death tax 
than the current estate tax, hobbled by high exemption amounts and significant 
unpopularity. 
A. Death as a Realization Event 
As a general rule, taxpayers do not have to include gain in their gross income until 
a realization event occurs.81 In the earliest days of the modern federal income tax, it 
was unclear whether the tax could even reach those gains if they accrued in prior 
years.82 The Supreme Court definitively put that confusion to rest in 1921, when it 
affirmed that gain had “been repeatedly declared to be taxable income within the 
meaning of the constitutional amendment and the acts of Congress.”83 
Around that same time, the Court embraced realization as a quasi-constitutional 
requirement for including gain in a taxpayer’s gross income.84 The realization rule 
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says that economic income will not be taxed until something happens that unlocks 
the value of that income.85 In the ensuing century, scholars have broadly agreed that 
the realization requirement, while administratively convenient, is not constitutionally 
mandated.86 With a couple small exceptions, the realization rule is still an important 
and fundamental part of the federal income tax.87 
The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) provides that realization occurs upon 
the “sale or other disposition of property,” at which time a taxpayer includes in gross 
income the difference between the amount realized and her adjusted basis in the 
property.88 Under current law, the tax law does not treat death as a realization event.89 
That exclusion means that a decedent pays no taxes on any appreciated property she 
holds when she dies. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this exclusion 
of capital gains at death reduced federal revenue in 2016 by about $32.9 billion.90 
There is no reason that the government needs to give up those billions of dollars 
in revenue. Realization does not occur solely upon the sale of an asset—it also occurs 
upon the “disposition” of an asset.91 As Professor Jeffrey Kwall has highlighted, 
disposition can “encompass any transfer of property regardless of whether 
consideration is received by the transferor.”92 While traditionally, the tax law has 
excluded gratuitous transfers from the ambit of realization, there is no reason it must. 
And changing the rule would not merely increase federal revenue. Professor Kwall 
argues persuasively that treating death as a realization event makes the tax law fairer 
and reduces economic distortions that the current rule produces.93 
Moreover, treating death as a realization event comports with the plain meaning 
of the statute. After all, if the Code meant to exclude gratuitous transfers from its 
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definition of realization events, it could have limited the recognition of gain to sales 
of property; the phrase “or other disposition” indicates that realization does not 
require that a taxpayer receive reciprocal benefit to trigger realization. The plain 
meaning of “disposition” is the “act of transferring something to another’s care or 
possession, esp. by deed or will.”94 Treating death as a realization event, then, clearly 
comports with the plain meaning of the Code. 
Even if the idea that death is not a realization event is too historically entrenched 
to permit us to give meaning to the plain language of the statute, Congress has the 
ability to designate death as a realization event. In a number of circumstances, 
Congress imposes taxes on income without requiring realization. Mark-to-market 
taxation, for instance, entirely disregards the realization requirement: a taxpayer 
subject to mark-to-market taxation instead pays taxes on the appreciation in her 
securities annually, whether she disposes of them or not.95 The Code requires dealers 
in securities to mark their securities to market.96 In addition, it permits dealers in 
commodities and traders in securities and commodities to elect mark-to-market 
taxation.97 And any taxpayer who owns a section 1256 contract must mark that 
contract to market every year, and that contract is “treated as sold for its fair market 
value on the last business day of such taxable year.”98 Even if death does not 
constitute a realization event, then, Congress can designate it as a deemed realization 
event. 
Is it fair to tax a decedent’s estate on unrealized appreciation? Thanks to the time 
value of money, the ability to defer taxation provided an economic benefit to the 
decedent during her lifetime.99 Even more tangible, an individual with appreciated 
property can tap into that appreciation—with no tax due—by borrowing against the 
property’s increased value.100 Because the decedent benefitted from the appreciation, 
it is fair to tax her on it.101 
Even if the estate tax continues to withstand the political assaults on its existence, 
it is plagued with problems, including complexity, economic inefficiency, and 
expense.102 Given the problems inherent in the estate tax, treating death as a 
realization event and taxing decedents on that now-realized appreciation would be 
both more effective and more administrable than the current estate tax regime.103 
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B. An Inheritance Tax, Not an Estate Tax 
In addition to treating death as a realization event, Congress should replace the 
zombie estate tax with an inheritance tax. Estate taxes and inheritance taxes differ in 
two primary ways. First, they differ in who they designate as the taxpayer. While the 
estate tax formally falls on and is paid by the decedent’s estate, an inheritance tax 
falls on the heirs who receive the bequest.104 Second, it naturally follows that while 
the estate tax is a wealth tax,105 an inheritance tax has more in common with an 
income tax, inasmuch as it treats the receipt of an inheritance as taxable income.106 
Inheritance taxes have at least three advantages over estate taxes. First, they do a 
better job of measuring ability to pay.107 Second, they provide “a more equitable, 
efficient, and simple pattern of incentives for donors and heirs than the estate tax.”108 
And third, they clarify who bears the tax, allowing society to understand better the 
fairness of its incidence.109 
Current federal tax law provides that inheritances do not constitute gross 
income.110 There is no intrinsic reason they could not, though. Of the fifty-two 
countries that impose some kind of estate or inheritance tax, thirty-five have chosen 
an inheritance tax.111 
And the inheritance tax is not merely something that other countries use. As of 
2017, eighteen states had some sort of death tax.112 Of those eighteen jurisdictions, 
fourteen had an estate tax, while six had an inheritance tax.113 While states that 
choose an inheritance tax rather than an estate tax make up a minority of states with 
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some kind of death tax, they demonstrate that, as a theoretical matter, inheritance 
taxation can work in the United States. 
There is nothing special about inheritances that somehow makes them ineligible 
for income taxation. In calculating gross income for federal income tax purposes, 
taxpayers must include several types of gratuitous transfers, including prizes and 
awards.114 In addition, gross income includes many other types of unearned income, 
ranging from dividends115 and interest116 to found money.117 In fact, while the 
modern income tax has decided that inheritances are not gross income, that 
conclusion was not inevitable. The short-lived 1894 income tax explicitly provided 
that income included “money and the value of all personal property acquired by . . . 
inheritance.”118 
Why did Congress decide to exclude bequests from gross income when it 
introduced the modern federal income tax? Congress did not explain its reasoning, 
either in 1913 when it enacted the rule or subsequently.119 Without some compelling 
explanation, the exclusion of bequests has only its long history to rest on. 
Even during that long history, people have questioned whether the tax law should 
exclude inheritances from income. According to Henry Simons, excluding 
inheritances “introduce[s] additional arbitrary distinctions.”120 Why is that? Because 
money is fungible; an individual’s consumption does not depend on whether she 
earned income at work, as a return on investment, or as a gift or inheritance. The 
money will buy precisely the same amount and type of consumption, irrespective of 
its provenance.  
True, the tax law does differentiate different types of income and treats them 
differently. Most notably, it taxes long-term capital gains at a lower rate than it taxes 
ordinary income.121 But the tax law does not treat capital gains differently from 
ordinary income because capital gains represent a different type of consumption. 
Rather, it treats capital gains differently to ameliorate distortions caused by taxing 
gain at one point in time, instead of when it accrues.122 
The receipt of a bequest or inheritance does not create these same distortions. In 
fact, treating bequests as income suffers from none of the economic distortions the 
income tax generally imposes. For instance, economic theory suggests that because 
taxing labor income decreases the after-tax benefits of work, on the margin it 
discourages work, encouraging taxpayers instead to substitute leisure.123 Likewise, 
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as discussed above, taxing gains at realization encourages taxpayers to defer realizing 
their gains. 
But taxing heirs on their receipt of bequests does not distort their economic 
decision-making. Treating the receipt as a taxable event will not cause an heir to 
work less, because the amount of money she receives has no relation to the amount 
she works. Similarly, she does not control when the decedent dies, so she cannot 
defer her receipt of income. Because the receipt of an inheritance is virtually entirely 
out of her control, taxing that receipt will not alter the heir’s behavior at all. Treating 
the inheritance as taxable income is not only possible, but efficient. 
Gross income generally includes all receipts of money and property, unless the 
tax law explicitly excludes that receipt.124 While the tax law does currently exclude 
inheritances from gross income,125 there is no compelling reason for it to do so. In 
fact, given the fact that taxpayers can use their inheritances in precisely the same 
manner they use other income, and that taxing inheritances does not create any 
economic distortions, Congress should eliminate the exclusion and include 
inheritances in gross income, in the same way it planned to in 1894. 
C. Basis and Inheritance 
Current tax law also provides for a step-up in basis on inherited property.126 This 
means that an heir takes a basis in inherited property equal to the fair market value 
of the property on the date of the decedent’s death. The step-up in basis allows an 
individual to keep appreciated property until her death. When she dies and leaves the 
property to her heirs, the gain is wiped out, and nobody pays taxes on that gain.127 
The step-up in basis presents a stark contrast to the rules surrounding the basis of 
property received by gift. Like inheritances, current law does not treat gifts as gross 
income.128 Unlike inheritances, though, the recipient of a gift takes a carryover basis 
in that gift.129 That means that the donee’s basis in property is the same as the donor’s 
basis in that property was; while giving a gift is not a realization event under current 
law, it also does not eliminate any built-in appreciation. Instead, it shifts that 
appreciation to another taxpayer. 
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Tax policy commentators have generally assumed that if Congress eliminated the 
estate tax, it would also eliminate the step-up in basis.130 In fact, in the 2001 Bush 
tax cuts, when Congress managed to temporarily eliminate the estate tax,131 it 
concurrently eliminated the step-up in basis.132 That elimination made sense: the 
step-up in basis is expensive. In its fiscal year 2018 list of tax expenditures, the 
Treasury Department estimated that the step-up in basis reduced federal revenue by 
$49.99 billion in 2016.133 
Still, when an estate tax exists, the step-up in basis is defended on at least two 
grounds. The first is that not stepping up the basis would tax estates twice; first, the 
estate tax upon the decedent’s death, and second, the income tax on built-in gain 
when heirs sold the property.134 The second is that carryover basis would be 
impracticable. It can be hard enough for the original owner to keep track of her 
basis,135 and it could be impossible for an heir to determine or reconstruct her now-
dead benefactor’s basis in property.136 
Merely eliminating the step-up in basis without also eliminating the estate tax has 
proved virtually impossible. The 2001 tax reform was not Congress’s only attempt 
at eliminating it; in 1976, Congress replaced the step-up in basis for inherited 
property with a carryover basis.137 Four years later, in the face of widespread 
opposition and criticism, Congress repealed this replacement and returned the step-
up in basis.138 
Ultimately, the step-up in basis is an odd provision of tax law. Basis is generally 
intended as a “placeholder for previously taxed income” to avoid the risk of double 
taxation.139 The step-up in basis, however, overcompensates, ensuring not only that 
appreciation doesn’t face double taxation, but that it in fact faces no taxation. 
Stepped-up basis does virtually the opposite from what basis is generally designed 
to do. The best that can be said for the stepped-up basis rule is that it survived because 
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using carryover basis proved politically infeasible and administratively difficult.140 
But these difficulties do not transform the step-up in basis into something justified 
or desirable.141 Rather, they leave it in place because it is already there, even though 
changes have made the administrative justifications for stepped-up basis “largely 
obsolete.”142 
Replacing the estate tax with an inheritance tax would allow Congress to 
definitively eliminate the step-up in basis. Congress would not have to replace it with 
the carryover basis that proved so administratively difficult, though. Rather, 
taxpayers would take a fair market value in inherited property. Practically, then, there 
would be little difference to an heir between a stepped-up basis under the estate tax 
and a fair market value in an inheritance tax. 
The shift would represent a substantive legal difference, though, for two main 
reasons. First, it would no longer rest on the vague and unjustified foundations that 
currently underlie the step-up in basis. Instead of being justified because other 
options are administratively difficult, heirs would get fair market value basis because 
they paid taxes upon receipt of the property. Rather than determining basis by an 
artificial standard that only applies to one situation, heirs would determine basis 
through the standard income tax rule, and basis would again reflect value that had 
been taxed.143 
In addition, the shift from stepped-up basis to fair market value basis would 
prevent income from going untaxed. Under the stepped-up basis rule, if a decedent 
holds appreciated property, the appreciation is never subject to income taxation, 
because stepped-up basis does not function as a placeholder for already-taxed 
income.144 Instead, because the heir would pay taxes upon receipt of the property, 
basis would function in its ordinary sense as a placeholder of taxed value. Because 
the heir would pay taxes on the fair market value of the inherited property, she would 
get fair market value basis justifiably and fairly, to avoid double taxation on gain. 
Her basis would arise for precisely the same reason and in precisely the same manner 
as anybody else who includes property in gross income calculates basis. 
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III. DETAILS OF THE POST-ESTATE TAX 
In spite of being an ineffective zombie tax, the estate tax has the momentum borne 
of a long history and inertia. As ineffective as it is, there are legal and administrative 
structures undergirding it, and taxpayers and tax planners have some degree of 
familiarity with it. Replacing it with the post-estate tax requires establishing new 
legal and practical scaffolding to address the different pressures likely to occur with 
the different tax. In the following Sections, I will address structures that need to be 
taken into account in designing and enacting the post-estate tax. 
A. Liquidity to Pay the Tax 
One significant problem that this proposal implicates is liquidity. How will the 
estate or the heir get cash to pay their tax obligations? This is not an issue, of course, 
where the estate has enough cash to pay the tax bill, or where it consists of liquid 
assets like publicly traded securities that can easily be sold to pay the taxes due. 
Where the estate has cash or liquid assets, it has the ability to pay its taxes. Likewise, 
where an heir receives cash or liquid assets from the decedent, paying taxes is not an 
issue. 
Some estates are made up of property that cannot, or in some cases should not, be 
sold to provide liquidity to pay taxes. The quintessential examples of these kind of 
estates are small businesses and farms. There is a widespread popular belief that the 
estate tax forces small business owners and family farmers to break up their 
businesses and farms to pay the current estate tax (which has the same liquidity 
problem).145 
These concerns are almost certainly overblown. The Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities estimates that fewer than fifty small businesses and farms will owe estate 
tax for 2017, and those that do owe estate tax will owe an average of six percent of 
their value in estate tax.146 In fact, it is likely that few, if any, farms have ever been 
sold to pay the estate tax.147 
While the liquidity concerns may be overblown with respect to the current estate 
tax, they will have some grounding with respect to this proposal. The high exemption 
amount in the current estate tax protects most estates from estate tax liability and 
reduces the amount of liability on those estates that do face the estate tax. But this 
proposal does not include any exemption: decedents will owe taxes on all of the 
appreciation triggered by their deaths, and heirs will owe taxes on the full value of 
the estate they receive. 
In cases where the inheritance is made up of both cash (or other liquid assets) and 
illiquid assets, liquidity remains relatively unimportant. But where the decedent left 
valuable illiquid assets—not just family farms and businesses, but art, jewelry, real 
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property, or other valuable assets—simply selling assets to pay the tax may be 
impracticable or may be undesirable. 
Current law provides that certain estates can defer their estate tax for up to five 
years and can then spread that payment out for up to ten years.148 To qualify under 
current law, an estate must contain a closely held business that makes up at least 
thirty-five percent of its value.149 Deferral has costs to the government.150 Among 
other things, allowing taxpayers to defer paying their tax liabilities “expose[s] the 
government to the risk of taxpayer default.”151 In cases where a significant portion 
of a decedent’s estate comprises illiquid assets, though, the government has 
determined that the benefits to taxpayers of allowing deferral outweigh the costs to 
the government. Because the government is currently comfortable allowing deferral 
of the estate tax in certain circumstances, it stands to reason that it should allow 
deferral of the taxes proposed here in similar circumstances. 
The deferral would apply differently to the decedent and to the heir, however. In 
the case of the decedent, I propose importing a modified version of the current estate 
tax version of deferral. Rather than applying solely to decedents whose estates were 
comprised largely of small businesses, however, it could potentially be triggered by 
any illiquid assets152 held by the decedent’s estate. 
It would only potentially be triggered, though. The decedent’s estate would 
calculate the tax on her gain realized upon leaving her assets to her heirs. The post-
estate tax would require the estate to pay taxes on the built-in gains to the extent of 
the cash and liquid securities it held. If the estate’s cash and liquid assets proved 
sufficient to pay all of its tax liabilities, it would not qualify for any deferral. To the 
extent that the tax due exceeded the cash and value of the liquid assets held by the 
estate, the estate could defer paying taxes on that excess. The design of the deferral 
itself could replicate the deferral that exists in the current estate tax. 
The treatment of heirs would necessarily be different. Under the inheritance tax 
regime I have proposed, heirs would include inheritances in their gross income and 
pay taxes at ordinary rates on the amounts inherited. In some cases, though, their 
receipt of valuable illiquid assets could make it difficult or impossible to pay taxes. 
Rather than paying the tax immediately, then, heirs would have a deferral option. 
Under that option, they could defer paying taxes on any illiquid assets that they 
inherited. However, heirs would take a zero dollar basis in any assets for which they 
made the election. Upon the sale or other disposition of those assets, they would pay 
taxes at ordinary rates, irrespective of whether the assets would otherwise have been 
capital assets in their hands. And they would pay interest on the gain at the Code’s 
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underpayment rate, running from the date on which taxes on the receipt of the 
inheritance would have been due without the election.153 
The election I propose is moderately punitive, but that is both by necessity and 
design. By necessity because the receipt of an inheritance is ordinary income; if an 
heir could transform that ordinary income into capital gain merely by making an 
election—one which provided the benefits of deferral, no less—every heir would 
elect to defer the recognition of income. Moreover, the interest also functions to 
eliminate the time-value-of-money benefits of deferral. 
To fully equalize the heir who pays the tax immediately and the heir who makes 
the election, though, the provision would only tax gain on capital assets at ordinary 
rates up to the fair market value at the time the assets were inherited; moreover, only 
that amount would be subject to interest. However, determining the value of an 
illiquid asset can be daunting, and bifurcating the gain into ordinary and capital gain 
(as well as imposing an interest charge on only part of the gain) would add significant 
complexity. Moreover, notwithstanding the interest charge, it is in the government’s 
interest to receive its tax revenue earlier rather than later. As a result, the additional 
costs of deferral ensure that taxpayers have an incentive to pay their taxes upfront 
rather than electing the deferral option. 
It is worth noting that, while the question of what to do with large and illiquid 
estates is tremendously salient, it is also significantly overstated.154 Researchers have 
never found an instance of heirs who had to sell a family business or family farm to 
pay the estate tax.155 In part, that is because few estates are composed of such a high 
percentage of illiquid assets that they lack the cash to pay the estate tax.156 It may 
also be because there are ways to plan around the problem of illiquid estates, 
including the use of life insurance to provide liquidity for an otherwise-illiquid 
estate.157 While certain details would change if Congress eliminated the estate tax, 
replaced it with an inheritance tax, and treated death as a realization event, decedents 
and heirs would have the same tools available to offset the illiquidity. Allowing them 
to take advantage of those tools and to elect deferral in certain circumstances, would 
continue to allow small businesses and farms to stay together where that was in the 
decedent’s and heirs’ best interests. 
B. Excludable Life Insurance 
Under current law, beneficiaries of a life insurance contract generally do not need 
to include the insurance proceeds in their gross income.158 This exclusion for life 
insurance proceeds has been part of the modern federal income tax since its 1913 
enactment.159 Although the exclusion of life insurance proceeds from gross income 
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has a long history, Congress never explained why it decided to exclude insurance 
proceeds.160 Many commentators believe, however, that Congress enacted the 
exclusions because it had doubts about whether life insurance proceeds met the 
constitutional definition of “income.”161 
On one occasion, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of 
including life insurance proceeds in gross income.162 Still, it is unlikely that a 
constitutional bar exists to treating life insurance as income. Although the Supreme 
Court has not weighed in on whether life insurance proceeds specifically qualify as 
gross income under the Constitution,163 it has held that the constitutional definition 
of gross income “extends broadly to all economic gains not otherwise exempted.”164 
This suggests that, if Congress were to decide to end the exclusion of life insurance 
proceeds from gross income, it would face no constitutional impediment. 
And Congress should end the exclusion. Under current law, which excludes 
inheritances from heirs’ gross income, it makes sense to exclude life insurance 
proceeds, too. After all, life insurance represents an alternative way for a decedent to 
pass wealth to her heirs. In fact, while the income tax excludes life insurance from 
beneficiaries’ gross income, the estate tax treats some life insurance proceeds as part 
of the estate.165 If the estate tax goes away, to be replaced by an income tax, it makes 
sense for the exclusion of life insurance proceeds to similarly go away. 
If the exclusion for life insurance proceeds remained, moreover, wealthy 
individuals would have an economic incentive to shift their assets from their estate 
to insurance, because life insurance would incur no income tax, while inherited assets 
would. Absent a tax difference, heirs would be indifferent between receiving cash 
from a decedent’s estate and insurance proceeds from her insurance company. 
Eliminating the exemption of life insurance proceeds from gross income would 
prevent this type of tax avoidance and ensure the fair and equal treatment of heirs. 
C. Skipping Generations 
Absent some sort of impediment in the tax law, wealthy families could reduce 
their collective estate tax liability by skipping their children and instead leaving 
inheritances to grandchildren. To prevent this type of estate tax avoidance, Congress 
enacted the generation-skipping tax.166 Without the generation-skipping tax, assets 
would be taxed to the estate of the original decedent, then taxed again in the estates 
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of the grandchildren when they died, but, because the assets never passed through 
the original decedent’s children’s estates, it would not be taxed at that generation.167 
The generation-skipping tax prevents this reduction of a family’s collective estate 
tax. Where a decedent leaves property to her grandchildren, skipping her children, 
her estate must pay an additional amount of tax, as if the inheritance had been 
received by her children and then they had left it to her grandchildren.168 If the estate 
tax were replaced by income tax provisions that treated death as a realization event 
and that required heirs to include inheritances in gross income, the idea of a 
generation-skipping tax would be unwieldy and would be largely unnecessary in any 
event. 
It would be unwieldy because an inheritance that skips a generation does not feel 
like that generation’s income. True, the income tax does, under certain 
circumstances, treat a person who does not actually receive income as if she had 
received that income. As far back as 1930, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
could “tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be 
escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to 
prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned 
it.”169 
Over time, this doctrine that income is taxed to the person who earns it has shifted 
slightly. Today, rather than focusing solely on who earned the money, courts look to 
who has the “ultimate direction and control” of the income.170 In certain cases, then, 
it would be possible for the child of a decedent to be required to include an 
inheritance in her gross income even though the inheritance skipped her and went, 
instead, to her children. But for that to be the case, the Internal Revenue Service 
would need to demonstrate that she had some control over who received the 
inheritance. In most cases, though, without receiving the inheritance, she would not 
include it in gross income. 
While the generation-skipping tax makes sense in the estate tax regime, then, it 
generally makes less sense in the income tax regime. In certain circumstances, a 
skipped heir could potentially exercise control. For instance, if the skipped potential 
heir had significantly influenced the decedent’s decision of where to leave her assets, 
that skipped individual may have exercised control. But generally, as long as the 
skipped potential heir did not control the decedent’s decision of where to leave her 
assets, the skipped potential heir would not have income. 
And if the would-be heir disclaims her inheritance? Under ordinary income tax 
principles, the recipient of a prize can refuse to accept that prize, and she does not 
have to include its value in her gross income.171 But disclaiming an inheritance is 
different. The individual who declines a prize exercises no control over who, if 
anybody, receives that prize. If she could require that the prize be awarded instead to 
a particular person, she would have exercised sufficient control that she would have 
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to include the prize in her gross income.172 Under the common law and most state 
laws, if an heir disclaims her inheritance, she is treated as dying before the decedent 
for inheritance purposes, and her heirs receive the inheritance instead, unless the 
decedent’s will provides otherwise.173 Effectively, then, in at least some 
circumstances, by disclaiming an inheritance, the would-be heir has also determined 
who receives it.174 In those cases, like cases where the disclaiming heir expressly 
directs where the inheritance goes, the skipped heir should include the inheritance in 
her gross income. 
D. Bequests to Surviving Spouses 
The estate tax does not reach all bequests. Notably, there is no estate tax on 
bequests made to a surviving spouse.175 The tax law arrives at this by deducting from 
the decedent’s estate any money or property left to the spouse.176 Effectively, then, 
the estate tax ignores any part of an estate that the decedent leaves to her surviving 
spouse. Substituting the income tax for the estate tax allows an opportunity to revisit 
this dynamic. Should a bequest to a surviving spouse be treated as a realization event? 
Should the bequest be income to the surviving spouse? 
In many cases, it should not. Where a couple files a joint return, the tax law 
recognizes them as a single taxpaying unit.177 As a result, transactions between the 
couple have no tax consequences. Effectively, for tax purposes, a transfer from one 
joint filing spouse to the other is the equivalent of moving money from one pocket 
to another. As such, there is no realization event, and there is no income. 
Whether or not the tax law should treat a married couple as a single taxable unit,178 
as long as it does, it makes sense to ignore bequests to surviving spouses for tax 
purposes. If the spouses make up a single taxable unit, transferring money and assets 
between each other has no tax relevance, even if it represents different ownership or 
control.179 The receipt of a bequest by a surviving spouse who filed a joint return 
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should not constitute the receipt of income, and that bequest should not be treated as 
a realization event.180 
The answer is different, however, where spouses file separate returns. Where 
spouses file separate returns, the tax law does not recognize them as a joint tax unit. 
Rather, each spouse pays income tax on the income he or she earns.181 Although they 
could have been treated as a single taxable unit, spouses who file separate returns 
have instead elected to be two different tax units. 
The current estate tax elides (or ignores) this distinction. It conditions its spousal 
exemption on marriage, not on the makeup of the tax unit.182 And perhaps this makes 
sense; after all, the estate tax is not an income tax, and there are no joint estate tax 
returns. But in the income tax context, treating joint and separate filers the same is 
far less defensible. 
As a result, where spouses file separate returns, a bequest to a surviving spouse 
should be a realization event for the decedent and should be income in the hands of 
the surviving spouse. The exemption granted to couples who file joint returns is not 
based on their affection or their familial closeness. It is based on the fact that they 
are a tax unit.183 As discussed above, as long as a married couple filing a joint return 
is treated as a single tax unit, ignoring transactions between the couple makes sense 
from an income tax perspective. But where they file separate returns—and thus are 
treated as separate taxpaying units—it does not make sense. The tax law does not 
generally ignore transactions between them,184 and the surviving spouse has not been 
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taxed on the decedent’s income. Therefore, where a married couple files separate 
returns, the decedent’s death should trigger realization in her appreciated assets, and 
the surviving spouse should include any bequest he receives in gross income.185 
Differentiating between joint and separate filers seems arbitrary in certain ways, 
and perhaps it is. Nonetheless, the tax law treats couples differently depending on 
whether they file joint returns or not, and bifurcating the income tax consequences 
of inheritances makes sense within a regime that already bifurcates for other 
purposes. 
IV. FAIRNESS IN THE POST-ESTATE TAX 
Implementing the post-estate tax will raise several questions of fairness. In 
particular, it will reach taxpayers who, because they had insufficient assets or 
income, never had to deal with the estate tax. In spite of its falling on people who did 
not pay the estate tax, though, it is both possible and likely that the post-estate tax 
can ultimately be a progressive change. In the following Sections, I will explain how 
it can maintain its progressivity and otherwise be designed with fairness in mind. 
A. Declining Progressivity 
Although the estate tax reaches less wealth with every increase in the exemption 
amount, many commenters see wealth taxation as playing “a critically important role 
in the preservation of progressivity in our nation’s tax system.”186 In its current 
iteration, no estate pays taxes on its first $11.18 million of assets in 2018.187 That 
means it only reaches the very wealthiest decedents. As such, the current estate tax 
is steeply progressive. 
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My proposed post-estate tax regime would be less obviously progressive, a 
necessary result of reaching a far larger swath of the public. In fact, anybody who 
died with appreciated assets or received an inheritance would owe taxes on that 
amount. The point of progressive taxation is not simply progressivity, though. 
Rather, it is fairly distributing the burdens of government in a manner that 
“maintain[s] some of the conditions of freedom and liberty basic to the thinking of 
most Americans.”188 In fact, a progressive tax with relatively low rates on a broad 
income base will maintain those conditions without encouraging expensive and 
complicated tax avoidance and evasion.189 
That is not to say that my proposal would eliminate progressivity. A progressive 
tax schedule is, after all, a hallmark of fairness when evaluating a tax regime.190 And 
my proposed tax regime would continue to be progressive. In fact, the result would 
be as progressive as the income tax rates provided. If the taxpaying public decided 
that the resultant tax distribution was insufficiently progressive, it could adjust the 
current rate structure. 
In some ways, including inheritances in heirs’ gross income would be fairer, both 
from a horizontal and a vertical equity perspective. After all, an individual who 
receives a $1 million inheritance has a $1 million benefit. Because she currently does 
not have to include inherited money in her gross income, though, she is in a different 
situation from another taxpayer who earns $1 million in labor income or even from 
a taxpayer who realizes $1 million of gain on the sale of capital assets. She can spend 
her inheritance in precisely the same manner that the other two can spend their 
money, but, in spite of being similarly situated economically, she does not pay any 
taxes on her inheritance. (It is true that the source of the heir’s receipts differs from 
the source of the workers, so the horizontal equity analysis is not completely on point. 
Nonetheless, because both have similar consumption potential, there is no 
compelling reason for one to pay taxes at a thirty-seven percent marginal rate and the 
other to pay nothing.191) 
Moreover, the current system violates vertical equity norms. An heir who receives 
$1 million is in a better financial situation than an individual who earns $50,000. In 
2018, though, an unmarried individual with $50,000 in taxable income will owe 
$6939.50 in federal income taxes.192 Meanwhile, the heir owes no taxes on her 
inheritance. 
Requiring heirs to include inheritances in gross income would shift this fairness 
determination. Heirs would owe taxes on their receipts at the same rate as workers 
who earned the same amount of money and enjoyed the same consumption potential. 
Moreover, taxing heirs on their inheritances would eliminate the current regressive 
treatment of earners in comparison with heirs. While the absolute level of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: 
A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 520 (1987). 
 189. Id. at 519. 
 190. Brunson, supra note 177, at 118 (“A fair tax system should include marriage 
neutrality, income pooling, and progressive tax rates.”). 
 191. I.R.C. § 1(j)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2018). 
 192. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18 § 3.01, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392. 
382 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:355 
 
progressivity may decline, as individuals who before did not owe any taxes would 
now owe them, it also may increase, for precisely the same reason.193  
In addition, if treating death as a realization event and inheritances as income 
makes the tax system significantly less progressive, the problem is easy to fix. 
Marginal tax rates and tax brackets are not fixed in stone. They are amenable to 
legislative change.194 To the extent that the burden of this change fell on low-income 
taxpayers, Congress could lower marginal rates at the bottom of the income scale 
and raise them at the top. In any event, though, as long as the income tax is 
progressive, the post-estate tax will correspond to the overall progressivity of the tax 
regime.195 
B. Reducing the Net Tax Paid 
Replacing the estate tax with an income tax permits decedents significantly more 
control over the net amount of tax paid. The amount of estate tax a decedent’s estate 
owes currently depends, in the first instance, on the size of the estate. The larger the 
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estate, the more the decedent owes.196 True, wealthy decedents have a number of 
ways to reduce their estate tax liabilities by, among other things, making charitable 
contributions and manipulating the perceived value of assets in their estate.197 Even 
after taking various structuring transactions into account, though, in the end, the 
amount of estate tax paid depends on the size of the estate. 
If we shift to my proposed income tax, decedents suddenly have significantly 
more control over the net amount of taxes paid. Decedents would have little ability 
to affect their own income tax on their assets’ unrealized appreciation, but the net 
amount of tax paid would depend on how many heirs received inheritances, on the 
amount of income those heirs had for the year, and on the amount they received as 
an inheritance. 
Why is that? Because heirs would pay income taxes on their inheritances at their 
own marginal rates. If a decedent had an estate worth $1 million, and, in 2018, left 
that $1 million to a single heir, that heir would have gross income of $1 million (plus 
whatever other income she had for the year). She would pay taxes at the top marginal 
rate of thirty-seven percent.198 How much she would actually pay in taxes would 
depend on a number of different factors, but assuming she was married, filed a joint 
return, and had no other income or deductions, she would owe $300,499 in taxes.199 
If the decedent left the $1 million evenly to four married heirs, the marginal rate on 
each heir would drop to twenty-four percent.200 Again, assuming that this was the 
heirs’ only income and that they had no dependents and no other deductions, each 
heir would pay $42,819 in taxes. Collectively, the four heirs would pay $171,276, a 
little more than half of the taxes paid by the single heir who received the full $1 
million bequest.201 By spreading her bequest among several heirs, the decedent 
would ensure that a higher net amount of her estate went to her heirs rather than to 
the government. 
And this is the way things should be. True, it reduces the federal government’s 
income. But, while the estate tax was initially intended primarily to raise revenue,202 
today, proponents point to it as a way to reduce the concentration of wealth. The 
current estate tax can only do that by taking and redistributing money, however. 
Because a decedent’s estate pays the same rate of tax whether the decedent leaves 
her money to one person or many, it does nothing to encourage wealthy individuals 
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to spread their money out. By imposing an income tax on heirs, on the other hand, 
wealthy individuals can reduce the amount of taxes they pay precisely by leaving 
smaller portions of their estates to more heirs. An income tax would, then, be more 
effective at reducing the concentration of wealth. 
Of course, even spreading money between heirs does not fully eliminate the 
concentration of wealth. Presumably, a majority of heirs would still be descendants 
of the decedent. Still, generation after generation, the money would spread out, and 
family members can fall out of sorts with each other. Moreover, without an 
exemption of more than $5 million, and given that the decedent would pay taxes on 
any unrealized appreciation at death, it is possible that moving estate taxation into 
the income tax could raise a similar amount of revenue as the current estate tax. 
C. Fiscal System Progressivity 
While tax scholars generally focus on the progressivity of the tax rate structure, 
Professor Edward D. Kleinbard points out that such a focus gives, at best, an 
incomplete view of progressivity. Rather than looking only at the progressive 
structure of tax rates, we should look at progressivity “with respect to our fiscal 
system taken as a whole.”203 
Professor Daniel Hemel and Kyle Rozema provide a simplified example of how 
an increase in taxes across the board can still lead to an inequality-decreasing 
result.204 They posit the elimination of a deduction that increases taxes on both a rich 
and a poor taxpayer.205 Under their hypothetical, the rich taxpayer’s taxes increase 
by $4.80, while the poor taxpayer’s taxes increase by $1.80.206 As a result of 
eliminating the deduction, the government has an additional $6.60 in revenue. If the 
government simply splits that amount and gives half to the poor taxpayer and half to 
the rich taxpayer (whether in cash or through services), the net result is that the poor 
taxpayer’s after-tax income increases by $1.50, while the rich taxpayer’s after-tax 
income goes down by $1.50.207 
That is not to say that policymakers should entirely ignore tax rates and brackets. 
Those are integral to the overall progressivity of the U.S. fiscal system. But they 
alone are not the hallmark of progressivity. “A ‘flat tax’ with a relatively high single 
tax rate, a large personal exemption, and cash subsidies to the lowest-income 
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households in fact can be more progressive in practice than a tax system that relies 
on increasing marginal rates alone.”208 
Almost irrespective of the rate structure, the two changes I propose in this Article 
should raise more revenue than the current exemption for inherited money and estate 
tax raise. In 2014, the estate tax only provided federal revenue of $19.3 billion, which 
represented far less than one percent of federal revenue.209 In large part, the amount 
of revenue was this low because of the unified credit, which allows decedents to 
exclude $5 million (adjusted for inflation) from their estates.210 In 2017, decedents 
could apply a unified credit of $5.49 million against their estate tax liability.211 
As of 2018, the amount of revenue raised by the estate tax should plummet. The 
tax bill signed by President Donald Trump doubled the unified credit.212 Under 
current law, then, no decedent with assets worth less than $11.18 million who dies 
in 2018 will pay the estate tax.213 
Under my proposed post-estate tax, virtually all estates—and virtually all heirs—
will pay taxes as the result of inheritances. Without any exclusion, federal revenues 
should increase substantially. To determine how progressive this proposal is, it is 
necessary to take into account not only how much people pay, but how the 
government will use its additional revenue. To the extent it deploys the additional 
revenue in ways that help the rich and injure—or, at least, do not help—the poor, the 
change will be regressive. But to the extent the government uses the additional 
revenue to fund programs and services that redound to the benefit of the poor, the 
overall fiscal system may be more progressive after the change than it was before, 
even if the imposition of taxes were less progressive than it is under current law.214 
D. Charitable Giving and the Post-Estate Tax 
Wealthy decedents have the ability, through proper planning, to reduce their estate 
tax liability. One of the important ways in which they reduce their estate tax is by 
making charitable bequests.215 Individuals who make charitable donations during 
their lifetimes can deduct those donations, provided they itemize.216 Similarly, a 
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decedent’s estate can deduct charitable bequests, reducing the net estate and thus 
reducing the estate tax it owes.217 
This estate tax charitable deduction is important to tax-exempt organizations: 
charitable giving is elastic, and, because the deduction reduces the cost of charitable 
bequests when compared with bequests to other heirs, lowering or eliminating the 
estate tax may dampen charitable bequests.218 Various studies have calculated that 
the absence of an estate tax could reduce charitable bequests by somewhere between 
twelve and thirty-seven percent.219 (It is hard to determine definitively the amount, 
if any, by which charitable bequests would go down because there is a competing 
consideration: with lower estate taxes, wealth would increase, allowing wealthy 
decedents to leave more to charity.220 Still, empirical evidence clearly demonstrates 
that increasing the after-tax cost of charitable giving reduces charitable giving.221) 
And the estate tax does not only impact charitable bequests: it also encourages 
individuals to make lifetime charitable contributions.222 In addition to being 
deductible against a donor’s income, such lifetime gifts also act “as an accelerated 
charitable bequest as the donated property is removed from the estate.”223 
Repealing the estate tax would not eliminate the benefit of charitable 
contributions; in many ways, in fact, it could increase their salience and importance. 
A decedent who made a testamentary charitable donation could deduct that amount 
against income she earned in her final year of life, including her previously 
unrealized income.224 While death would become a realization event, charitable 
donations would reduce that realization. 
A decedent could use charitable contributions to entirely avoid realizing the 
income. Under current law, a taxpayer who donates appreciated assets to charity does 
not have to include the unrealized appreciation into her income225 and can deduct the 
fair market value of the appreciated assets.226 To the extent that a decedent donates 
assets with unrealized appreciation to charity, her estate should similarly get a 
charitable deduction for the fair market value of the assets and be permitted to 
exclude the gain from her gross income. 
And the tax-reducing benefits of testamentary charitable donations would not be 
limited to decedents. It would also reduce the amount of taxes her heirs would 
otherwise pay. It would do so not by virtue of deductions but by reducing the amount 
of taxable inheritance that she received. Moreover, even if the decedent chose not to 
make testamentary donations to charity, and instead chose to pay taxes on unrealized 
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appreciation, if any, in the estate, an heir could still choose to reduce her taxes by 
donating all or part of her inheritance to charity and deducting that donation. 
Permitting decedents and heirs to avoid paying income taxes through charitable 
contributions would have two significant benefits. The first is that, by reducing the 
cost of charitable contributions, it would increase the amount of charitable 
contributions. The Tax Policy Center estimated that, as a result of the decrease in 
itemizers attributable to the tax bill of 2017, charitable giving would drop by about 
five percent.227 That estimate does not take into account the increased estate tax 
exemptions, which will likely reduce testamentary charitable giving.228 By providing 
a new benefit to charitable giving, eliminating the estate tax and replacing it with 
realization upon death and upon the receipt of an inheritance will make up at least 
some of the lost giving. 
Charitable giving is not, however, one of the goals underlying the estate tax. The 
second significant benefit works toward one of the current estate tax goals. 
Inheritance is, after all, a zero-sum game. Any money left to one recipient is no 
longer available to other recipients. As such, an incentive to give to charity is an 
incentive not to give to heirs. Allowing decedents to avoid paying taxes on unrealized 
gains (and allowing heirs to offset inheritance income) through charitable deductions 
also reduces the hereditary concentration of wealth. 
Allowing charitable deductions to offset taxes at death does reduce the amount of 
revenue these replacements for the estate tax would raise, as do all charitable 
deductions. Congress decided, though, that encouraging taxpayers to support a wide 
range of charitable endeavors that the government would not or could not directly 
fund was in society’s best interest and willingly gave up that revenue.229 Allowing 
decedents and heirs to offset their income through charitable contributions fits within 
this regime that Congress chose. At the same time, it advances a significant modern 
goal of estate taxation, and this advancement militates in favor of permitting the 
deductions. 
CONCLUSION 
The modern estate tax has been with us for more than a century. In that century, 
it has borne the burden of both raising revenue and reducing the concentration of 
wealth. Whether it ever accomplished its goals to a measurable degree, it does not 
currently do so. In fact, it has been so crippled by congressional action that it is 
effectively a zombie tax—not truly living, but not yet dead. 
Since 1913, the federal income tax has provided that taxpayers do not have to 
include inheritances in their gross income.230 While Congress did not explain in 1913 
why it chose to exclude these gratuitous transfers from recipients’ gross income,231 
it also did not limit its beneficence to excluding inheritances from gross income. 
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While it is true that Congress’s initial purpose in enacting the estate tax was to 
raise revenue, as a result of the high exemption amount and the low estate tax rate, 
the estate tax no longer raises a significant percentage of federal revenue. On the 
other hand, rhetorically, at least, it serves as a backstop against extreme inequality. 
The fact that combating income equality was not its original purpose (and, for that 
matter, the fact that it is only minimally successful in doing so) does not mean that, 
in designing a replacement for the estate tax, policymakers must focus primarily on 
raising revenue. Today, a century after its original enactment, the government’s 
revenue sources have changed significantly, not least because the income tax 
changed from a class to a mass tax. Instead of focusing primarily on raising revenue, 
we could replace the estate tax with something that will more effectively combat the 
accumulation of income among a small number of Americans. 
In short, Congress has largely neutered the estate tax, allowing it to live on in a 
zombie state. The taxpaying populace fears the estate tax, notwithstanding the low 
chance that they will actually encounter it, and, in spite of the rarity with which it 
reaches actual estates, politicians are able to capitalize on its mere existence to further 
their own political wins.232 
It is time, then, to eliminate the last vestiges of the estate tax. It raises little 
revenue, does very little to prevent the accumulation of wealth, but provokes costly 
and wasteful behavior. To avoid it, wealthy individuals engage in expensive tax 
planning, planning that reduces their net wealth without benefiting society at large. 
The purposes of the estate tax—raising revenue and preventing the accumulation 
and concentration of wealth among a small group of individuals and families—would 
be better served by replacing the tax on estates with an income tax. Treating death as 
a realization event would prevent appreciation in wealth from going untaxed. 
Treating inheritances as income in the hands of heirs would raise revenue and 
encourage decedents to spread their estates to many people. These two things would 
also diminish incentives for tax planning and would spread the progressive tax 
burden more fairly. Finally, shifting from an estate tax to an income tax would allow 
the special stepped-up basis rule to go away, instead utilizing ordinary basis rules. 
With these three changes, we could put to rest the zombie estate tax that haunts 
Americans’ nightmares. 
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